Network Formation with Endogenous Decay by Francesco Feri
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=681084
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei




NOTA DI LAVORO 35.2005
MARCH 2005
CTN – Coalition Theory Network
Francesco Feri, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Ca’ Foscari UniversityNetwork Formation With Endogenous Decay
Summary
This paper considers a communication network characterized by an endogenous
architecture and an imperfect transmission of information as in Bala and Goyal (2000).
We propose a similar network's model with the difference that it is characterized by an
endogenous rate of information decay. Endogenous decay is modelled as dependent on
the result of a coordination game, played by every pair of directly linked agents and
characterized by 2 equilibria: one efficient and the other risk dominant. Differently from
other models, where the network represents only a channel to obtain information or to
play a game, in our paper the network has an intrinsic value that depends on the chosen
action in the coordination game by each participant. Moreover the endogenous network
structure affects the play in the coordination game as well as the latter affects the
network structure. The model has a multiplicity of equilibria and we produce a full
characterization of those are stochastically stable. For sufficiently low link costs we find
that in stochastically stable states network structure is ever efficient; individuals can be
coordinated on efficient as well as on risk dominant action depending on the decay
difference among the two equilibria in the single coordination game. For high link costs
stochastically stable states can display networks that are not efficient; individuals are
never coordinated on the efficient action.
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In recent years there is a growing interest about social and economic 
networks. The reason is that these models fit better the real environment to 
explain many economic phenomena. For example, we remember the diffusion 
of new technologies, products and conventions, labor search, diffusion of 
information and social learning, internal and external firm’s relations, 
customized equipment between a group of firms, and so on. The fundamental 
idea is that, against the assumption that agents in an economic system are 
anonymous, there is the empirical evidence that agents must have a link to do 
any kinds of transaction and that  in an economic system  interaction among 
agents (or the collection of information) has a cost. These costs together with 
the relative benefits influence the interaction structure that, in her turn, affects 
the final result. Indeed in a market two agents can exchange the goods if and 
only if they are in touch (or they are linked) and the pattern of links affects the 
competition for goods and profits. For these reasons many authors have 
examined the role of interaction structure and its evolution in an economic 
contest.  
The literature on social networks concentrates on the one hand, upon the 
contrast between efficiency and stability of various possible structures and, on 
the other, upon the cost–benefit relation deriving from those networks. Jackson 
and Wolinsky [14] show how efficiency and stability do not always coincide. 
Their model considers a situation where each individual transmits a value into 
the network which is discounted according to the number of links involved. 
Moreover, they study those allocation rules which permit both efficiency and 
stability simultaneously. Later Bala and Goyal [1] consider a similar model, but 
with the differences that the links can also be one-sided. They study both those 
cases in which the benefit flows in one direction only, and those in which the 
benefit flows in two directions. Furthermore, they consider the dynamics of the 
link formation. Concerning this last is a work by Watts [21] that considers the 
dynamics of network formation in the case of the connection model of Jackson 
and Wolinski [14].  
An open question in these papers is that the generated payoff is independent 
of any other action that is different from the creation or deletion of links in the 
networks. In detail decay is always considered exogenous or, from another 
point of view, independent of any action of the agents. We try to solve this 
problem considering a network characterized by an imperfect transmission of 
information as in the Bala and Goyal [1] but assuming that the rate of decay 
into the network is endogenous: the rate of decay in a given link depends on the  
3
results of a social game between the 2 (directly) linked agents. There are 2 
possible actions: the first one produces a zero decay if both players choose it 
and a maximum decay if the players choose different actions; the second one 
produces an intermediate value of decay indifferently from the partner’s choice. 
In this way we model a trade off  between complexity (and efficiency) and 
compatibility. This trade off is illustrated by the following example: an 
individual has to pass a message and can write it in word format or ascii format. 
The first choice is more efficient only if the reader has the Word software. The 
second choice is less efficient but all the people can read it. This model has 
other two important features: the value of each individual depends on her 
position inside the network and  the interaction between two agents affects all 
agents in the network. We are able to produce a full characterization of 
stochastically stable states: the networks characterized by the efficient action 
are stochastically stable for relatively low link cost, otherwise are stochastically 
stable those networks characterized by the risk dominant action. 
Other related papers are those of Jackson and Watts [12], Goyal and Vega 
[9], Droste, Gilles and Johnson [4]. These consider the payoff generated by 
links as determined by the interaction strategy between individuals directly or 
indirectly linked. The fundamental idea in these papers is that i ndividuals 
establish links to play a coordination game. As in our paper, to  the choice as to 
whether to link or not is added the choice as to which interaction strategy to use 
with other individuals. Differently from our paper, these models have in 
common the idea that the payoff is generated only from the direct link or, as in 
the paper of Vega and Goyal [9], the payoff is also generated from the indirect 
link, but by means of a simplification, namely that the benefit deriving from the 
interaction of two  individuals is independent of the kind of link (direct or 
indirect). 
The paper is organized in the following way: in section 2 we describe the 
model. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4 concludes the discussion 
and provide possible directions for futher research. 
2. The Model  
Let  { } 1,2,..., Nn =  be a set of agents where  3 n ‡ . We assume that every 
agents is endowed with one unit of private information of value 1 as well as of a 
quantity of information deriving from other agents in the network.  Each agent 
can choose a subset of other players with whom to establish links and to play a 
bilateral game. Let  ( ) ,1,1,1, ,..,,... iiiiiiin ggggg -+ =  be the set of links supported by  
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player i where  { } 0,1 ij g ˛  for each  {} i \ N j˛ . We say agent i supports a link 
with agent  j if  1 ij g = . The set of all players link decisions,  denoted by 
( ) 12 ,,.... n gggg = , defines a direct graph  { } , N G  called network. The network 
will be denoted by g.  Specifically, the network g has the set of players N, as its 
set of vertices, and its set of arrows,  NN G￿·, is defined as follows: 
(2.1)        ( ) { } ,:1 ij ijNN g G=˛·=  
Given a network g, we say that 2 players are directly linked if at least one of 
them has established a link with the other one, i.e.  { } max, 1 jiij gg= . To 
describe the direct links with no regard who support them, we define the closure 
{ } max, ijijji ggg = .  Let  ( ) ,1,1,1, ,..,,... iiiiiiin ggggg -+ =  be the set of direct links of 
agent i. Then  ( ) 12 ,,.... n gggg =  describes the graph with no regard who support 
the links. Let  ( ) { } , ;:1
d
ij NigjN g ”˛=  be the set of players in network g 
with whom player  i has established links, while  ( ) ( ) ;;
dd vigNig ”  is its 
cardinality. In a similar way, let  ( ) { } , ;:1
d
ij NigjNg ”˛= be the set of 
players in network  g with whom player  i is connected, while 
( ) ( ) ;;
dd vigNig ”  is its cardinality. We say there is a path in g between i and 
j if either   1 ij g =  or there exists a set of agents { } { } 12 ,..../, m jjjNij ˛  such that 
112 ....1
m ijjjjj ggg ==== . By  ij T  we denote the set of all paths between agents i 
and j. The distance in g between agents i and j, denoted as  ( ) ,; dijg,  is defined 
as the number of links of the shorter path in  ij T . The shorter path is that with the 
lower number of direct links. A sub-network g g ￿ ¢  is called a component of g 
if for all  ' g j , i ˛ ,  j i „ , there exists a path in  g¢connecting i and j, and there 
does not exist a path between an agent in  g¢ and one in  \ gg ¢. A network with 
only one component is called connected. Given any  g, the notation  gij +  
denotes the network obtained with the formation of a new link between i and j 
in the network g. Similarly,  gij -  refers to the network obtained deleting the 
link  ij g  in  g . By minimally connected we denote a connected network g such 
that  gij -  is a no connected network for all  i,jg ˛  such that  ij 1 g = . Finally 
we introduce the following notation. A network is called:  
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•  empty and denoted by 
e g  if  , 0 ij g = for  , ijN "˛;  
•  star and denoted by
s g  if there exists some  iN ˛  such that, for all 
{ } ,\ kjNi ˛ ,  jk „ ,   , 1 ij g = and  , 0 kj g = ; 
•  complete and denoted by 
c g  if  , 1 ij g = for  , ijN "˛; 
•  essential if  0 ijji gg ￿=  for , ijN "˛ 
Among the star networks we denote with 
cs g  the star with all the links 
supported by the central agent, with 
ps g  the star with all links supported by 
peripheral agents and with 
ms g  all the intermediate cases. The links are costly: 
every agent pays a cost k0 >  for each link she supports.  In our model, as in 
Bala and Goyal [1] or Goyal and Vega Redondo [9], link formation is one-sided 
and non-cooperative: the formation of a link requires only the consensus of the 
supporting player. 
In our model decay is endogenous. We assume that every pair of directly 
linked agents plays a 2 x 2 symmetric game in strategic form with a common 
action set given by  { } b a,     A= . For each pair of actions  A a , a ˛ ¢ , the share of 
information received by a player choosing  a when the partner plays  a’  is 





         
where 0,5e1 ££ 
Then, the quantity of information received by a player choosing  a when the 
partner plays a’ is given by  ( ) a,ax d ¢ ￿ , where x is the information owned by 
the partner. There are 2 Nash equilibria in pure strategies:  ( ) a a,  and  ( ) b b, . 
The first one is  efficient, the second one is risk dominant. Each agent plays the 
game with all directly linked agents and have to use the same action in all 
engaged  bilateral games. In the following we indicate an agent(s) choosing 
action a by a-agent(s) where  { } a, ab ˛ . 
For a generic agent i the strategy space is identified with  A   x   G     S i i = , where 
i G  is the set of possible link decisions and A is the common action space of the 
underlying bilateral game. In the following we consider that  G Gi =   N i˛ " . 
  a   b  
a   1  0 
b   e  e  
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Then, given the strategies of other players,  ( ) i1i1i1n ss,...s,s,....s --+ = , the payoff 
of player i deriving from her participation to the game playing some strategy 
( ) , iii sa g =  is given by:  









ºß ￿￿  
where  { } iij Nj:T =„˘  and  ij t  represents the path between players i and j such 






= ￿ . 
Time is modelled discretely,  1,2,3,.... t =  At time t the state of the system 
will be given by strategy profile  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } , sttat g =  specifying the action 
chosen and links established by each player ( ( ) ( ) ( ) { } , iii sttat g = ). At every 
period t one agent obtains, by a probability p, a chance to revise her strategy. 
When an agent receives this opportunity, she select a best response  to strategy 
profile in the previous periods: 
(2.4)    ( ) ( ) argmax,1
i isSii stsst ˛- ˛P- Øø ºß ; 
If there are several best responses, then any one of them is chosen with equal 
probability. This strategy revision  process defines a Markov chain on 
12 ... n SSSS ”··· . As we will see, in our framework, this Markov chain could 
be characterized by several absorbing states. Then, the equilibria are depending 
on the initial conditions.   
To select among all possible equilibria, we employ the standard techniques 
used by Kandory, Mailath and Rob [15] and Young [21]. We suppose, 
conditional on the chance to revise her strategy, players make mistakes. In this 
case, player chooses her strategy at random with some small probability   
0 e > . For any  0 e > , the process defines an aperiodic and irreducible Markov 
chain that has a unique invariant probability distribution  e m . We analyze the 
structure of  e m  as the probability of mistakes  e  converges to zero. We define 
m me e ˆ lim 0 = ﬁ , then a state s is called stochastically stable if   ( ) 0 s ˆ > m .  
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3. Results  
In this section we characterize the efficient states, study the characteristics 
of equilibria when dynamic is not perturbed by mistakes and, finally, examine 
the stochastic stability of different configurations. 
3.1 Efficiency 
We use the utilitarian concept of efficiency: the efficient state is that 
producing the higher total net payoff (gross payoff less cost of links).   
Proposition 1: If kn £ , in all efficient states all agents are coordinated on 
action a  and  networks are minimally connected. If kn > , only empty networks 
are  efficient.  
As the intuition provided below is simple, a formal proof  is omitted. Any 
network architecture with agents coordinated on action  b  is dominated by an 
equal network with agents coordinated on action  a . When all agents are 
coordinated on  a , from proposition 4.3 in Bala and Goyal [1] follows that for 
kn £  minimally connected networks are efficient otherwise, if  kn > , the 
efficient networks are empty.  
There are several efficient network architectures : all kinds of star, the line 
and, more in general, all architectures minimally connected and with minimum 
number of links: to connect n agents are n ecessary at least n-1 links. This is 
possible because there are not differences in payoff between a direct link and a 
indirect one, when all individuals are coordinated on action  a  ( remember 
( ) 1 , = a a p ). If  ( ) 1 , < a a p , we could restrict the set of efficient networks 
because the share of information arriving from a player to another is decreasing 
with the number of links that have to pass through.  In according to proposition 
1 in Jackson and Wolinsky [13], we find efficient networks are complete or star  
or empty depending on the link cost k. 
3.2 Static equilibria.    
The following proposition describes the general characteristics of strict 
Nash equilibria in a network with endogenous decay. 
Proposition 2: Let  { } , sa g =  be a strict Nash equilibrium. Then the network is 
essential, connected and all agents are coordinated on the same action. 
Moreover if  1 k <  the chosen action could be a  or  b , otherwise only  b  can 
be chosen.    
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The proposition describes two important features of strict Nash  equilibria: 
aggregation and conformity. A state with two or more separated components is 
not a strict Nash equilibrium as well as a state with agents coordinated on 
different actions. Note that we do not exclude the existence of Nash equilibria 
in which agents are choosing different actions in the same component 
(aggregation without conformity). We only say that these equilibria are not 
strict Nash. More in detail, for k<1, networks with agents coordinated on  a  
could be strict Nash equilibria as well as networks with agents coordinated on 
b . On the contrary, for k>1 only networks with agents coordinated on  b  could 
be strict Nash. A sub-network g g ￿ ¢  is called a-group, where  { } a, ab ˛ , if 
' ig "˛  is an  a-agents and, for all  ' g j , i ˛ ,  j i „ , there exists a path in 
g¢connecting i and j and does not exist a direct link between an agent in g' and 
one  a-agent in   \' gg. With this definition in hand we can prove the 
proposition. 
Proof: The proof goes in two steps. In the first one we prove that all strict Nash 
equilibria with conformity are essential and connected. In the second step we 
show that a strict Nash equilibrium without conformity does not exists. Step 1. 
Assume a strict Nash equilibrium where all agents are choosing action a . From 
proposition 4.2 in Bala and Goyal [1] we know that when  1 k <  only 
cs g  is a 
strict Nash equilibrium. In this state every agents obtain a strictly positive 
payoff. Changing action an agent could obtain a payoff's proportional reduction 
at least of  1 e - . Then the considered state is a strict Nash equilibrium. For 
1 k > , from proposition 4.2 in Bala and Goyal [1] we know that the unique 
candidate to be a strict Nash equilibrium is 
e g . But in our model this network is 
never strict Nash because the player can switch to other action obtaining the 
same (zero) payoff. Now, assume a strict Nash equilibrium where all agents are 
choosing action  b . The proof for essentiality and connecteness derives directly 
from proposition 5.3 in Bala and Goyal [1]. If an agent switches to action a , 
she obtain a zero payoff. Then the considered state is a strict Nash equilibrium. 
Step 2. Consider any strategy profile without conformity where n' agents are 
choosing action  a ,  n" agents are choosing  b  and n’>1 
4. Using the same 
arguments as in proposition 4.2 in Bala and Goyal [1] we know that, if k<1, in a 
                                                 
4 The special case with n' =1 cannot be a strict Nash equilibrium because the unique a -
agent obtains zero payoff: she could change action obtaining at least a zero payoff (for example, 
if she changes action and does not link with anyone obtain zero payoff).  
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strict Nash equilibrium, all a -agents have to link among themselves in a 
cs g . 
Suppose that  b -agents are in one or more separated components. This state 
cannot be a strict Nash equilibrium because any  b -agent, forming a link with 
an a -agent, could obtain a payoff of  n'ek ￿- that is strictly positive given (2.2)
. All connected states where  a -agents support links with  b -agents cannot be 
strict Nash equilibrium either because a -agents obtain a negative net payoff 
from their links with  b -agents
 5. Finally, all connected states where  b -agents 
support links with  a -agents cannot be strict Nash equilibrium because  b -
agents are indifferent among which a -agent to be tied. In the case for  1 k ‡ , in 
a strict Nash all agents must be  b -agents because a strict Nash equilibrium for 
a -agents does not exist.  QED. 
3.3 Dynamic 
In this section we describe the dynamic properties of different equilibria. 
First we study the no-perturbed dynamic in the complete game. After  we 
provide a complete description of all equilibria that are stochastically stable. 
Proposition 3: There exists a  ( ) nk,e  such that for  ( ) nnk,e >  the dynamic 
process converges with probability 1 to a state characterized by an essential 
and connected network and with all agents coordinated on the same action or 
to a state with an empty network. 
If k<1 the system goes in a state where all agents are coordinated on  a  and 
the network is essential and minimally connected or in a state with all agents 
coordinated on  b  and connected network. If k>1 the system goes in an empty 
network or in a state with all agents coordinated on  b  and connected network. 
Proof:  The proof relies on showing that from any network there is a positive 
probability to transit to an absorbing set in a finite time. The results will follow 
from the standard theory of Markov chains. The proof goes on two steps. In the 
first one we show as, starting from any initial state, the process transits to a 
connected network or to 
e g  in finite time. In the second step we show as, 
starting from any connected network with heterogeneity, the system goes in a 
state with conformity.   
Step 1:  In this step we use the result stated in the following lemma. 
                                                 
5 an a -agent supporting one link with a  b -agent obtains a negative payoff of -k.  
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Lemma 1: Let be  ke > . Consider any initial state in which all agents chose 
action b . Then if:  
a) ek1 << the dynamic process converges to a connected state with all agents 
coordinated on action a  or  b ;  
b) if k1 >  the dynamic process coverges to a connected state with all agents 
coordinated on action b  or to 
e g ;  
The proof is in appendix. 
Assume ke < . In any state the best response for  b -agents is to be tied, directly 
or indirectly, with all others, while for a -agents is to be tied with all other a -
agents. Then a no-connected network cannot be an absorbing state. Assume a 
network with  h components (h1 ‡ ),  n'  agents choosing action  a  and  n" 
agents choosing action  b . If  n'2 ‡
6 and  1 ek <<  the best response of  a -
agents is to be tied in unique a -group or to switch to action  b . If the case is 
the first one the best response of  b -agents is to be directly or indirectly tied to 
the  a -group (switching action or not) and the system goes in a connected 
network. If the case is the second the system could go in a state with only  b -
agents. Using the result stated in the part  a of lemma 1 we are able to 
demonstrate the convergence in a connected state. Assume  1 k > . Giving 
repeatedly the chance to revise the strategy only to a -agents, they delete their 
links between them. The proof of this result is omitted because use similar 
arguments than in theorem 4.1 in Bala and Goyal [1]. Then, from the result 
stated in part b of lemma 1 we know that the system will go in connected state 
with all agents coordinated on action  b  or in 
e g . 
Step 2:  In this step we use the result stated in the following lemma. 
Lemma 2: Let be 
2 eeke -<<. Then in a  b -group of an absorbing state, the 
maximum distance between 2 player is bounded above by the minimum integer 
value of  l  such that 
1 l kee
+ <- . 
The proof is in appendix. 
Now we  prove as, starting from a connected network g with  n'  a-agents and 
n"  b -agents, the system converges towards the conformity for different levels 
                                                 
6 In the special case with n'1 = , the unique a -agent  has in the set of her best responses 
to switch action, given that her payoff is zero and that  switching action obtain at least zero 
payoff; therefore the proof follows lemma 1. 
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of link cost with positive probability. Then we show that the probability to go 
from a state with conformity to another without, is zero. From step 1 results that 
only if  k1 <  the system could converge to a connected network characterized 
by no conformity.  Therefore we discuss only the case for k1 < . Assume that 
2 kee <- . The dynamic process converges in a state where every  b -agent is 
directly linked with all other b -agents and with the a -group. We note that  b -
agents are indifferent to choose a specific  a -agents or another to form a link 
and any  a -agent is chosen with equal probability. Therefore exists a positive 
probability that best response dynamic converges to a state where all  b -agents 
are linked to the same a -agent. The payoff of an a -agent receiving links from 
all  b -agents and supporting x links, from choosing action a is: 
(2.5)      ( ) ( ) n'1xk a P=--￿  
while choosing action  b  obtains:  
(2.6)      ( ) ( ) n'n"1exk b P=+-￿-￿  
From the stability condition,  ( ) ( ) ab P>P , we obtain: 








Now we consider a  b -agent. Among all complete network architectures the 
larger possible payoffs is:  
(2.8)      ( ) ( ) n'n"1ek b P=+-￿- 
Switching to action a  the payoff is:  
(2.9)      ( ) n'k a P=-  
From the stability condition,  ( ) ( ) ba P>P , we obtain:  







that is incompatible with the conditions (2.7). Finally we note how in a state 
with conformity to switch action is never a best response because it decrease 
the payoff (from a  to b ) or produce a zero payoff (from  b  to a ). 
Assume that 
2 eeke -<<. In this case the dynamic process converges in a 
state characterized from only one  b -group given that to form a link with a no 
connected agent yields a positive payoff. The network architecture of  b -group 
is not well defined. The stability condition for a generic  b -agent i, such that 
she has no incentive to switch action, is:  
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(2.11)      ( ) ''1 i nn bd P+￿>-  
where  ( ) i b P  is the net payoff deriving from the  b -group and  e d £  
depending on i is directly or indirectly linked with the a -group.  Follows that 
' n is bounded above by: 










The stability condition for a generic a -agent j such that she has no incentive to 
switch action, is: 
(2.13)      ( ) ( ) '1'1 j nne b ->-￿+P  
where  ( ) j b P  is the better possible net payoff deriving from the  b -group. 
Then,  ' n is bounded below by:  









Increasing the number of agents in the network have to increase both n' and n". 
We note that it is impossible to increase n" without increase n'. Indeed from 
lemma 2 we know that in an absorbing set payoff deriving from the  b -group 
due to an agent more is bounded below by
7 ek - . Then increasing n", to satisfy 
condition  (2.14), n' have to increase too. Viceversa, increasing  n', to satisfy 
condition (2.12), n" have to increase too. Using this consideration we find that 
exists a value of n, denoted by  ( ) nk,e , such that (to satisfy the equilibrium 






 for all  ( ) nnk,e > . In this situation all  b -
agents have as best response to form a direct link with  a -group. The stability 
condition for an a -agent receiving links from all  b -agents and that for a  b -
agent with the greater possible payoff are the same than in previous case, (2.7) 
and (2.10), that are not compatible.  
Finally we have to consider the case  1 ek << . Using the same argumentation of 
previous case, we can say that exists a value of n, denoted by  ( ) ˆ nk,e , such that 







                                                 
7 From lemma 2, adding an agent more at a distance larger than l from agent i, this can 
improve her payoff at least of e-k supporting a new link. If the new agent stays at a distance 
smaller than l from agent i , this receive a  payoff larger than e-k.  
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this state all  b -agents have as best response to form a direct link with a -group. 
Then, computing as in previous case the equilibrium conditions, we obtain the 
incompatible conditions (2.7) and (2.10). QED. 
The system converges to an equilibrium state in according to initial 
conditions. But for a given interval of relevant parameters (k, e, n) we are not 
able to produce a full description of equilibrium states. To select among all 
possible equilibria, we use the concept of stochastic stability: conditional on the 
chance to revise their strategy, players make mistakes and choose their strategy 
at random with some small probability   0 e > .  
We denote a minimally connected network by 
m g . The state characterized 
by a 
x g  network with all agents coordinated on action  a,  { } a,  ab ˛ ,  is 
denoted by  ( )
x ga . We describe the result regarding the stochastically stable 
states in the following theorem. 
Theorem 1: There exists a  ˆ n such that for all  ˆ nn > : 
 a) If  
2 kee <-  there exists a  ( ) 1 ˆ , ken such that for  1 ˆ kk >  only  ( )
m g a  are 
stochastically stable and for  1 ˆ kk <   only  ( )
c g b  are stochastically stable.  
b) if 
2 eeke -<<, there exists  ( ) 2 ˆ , ken  such that for  2 ˆ kk >  only  ( )
m g a  are 
stochastically stable and for  2 ˆ kk <  only  ( )
cs g b ,  ( )
ms g b  and  ( )
ps g b  are 
stochastically stable.  
c) If   1 ek <<  there exists  ( ) 3 ˆ , ken such that for  3 ˆ kk >  both  ( )
cs g a  and 
( )
ps g b  are stochastically stable and for  3 ˆ kk <  only  ( )
cs g a  are stochastically 
stable.  
d) If  1 k >  there exists  ( ) 4 ˆ , ken  such that for  4 ˆ kk >  only 
e g  is stochastically 
stable, and for  4 ˆ kk <  both 
e g  and  ( )
ps g b   are stochastically stable. 
To demonstrate this theorem we use the definition of recurrent set in the 
sense of Samuelson (Def. 7.4 pag 220). Then we use the result of proposition 
7.7  of Samuelson (pag 221): when an absorbing state belonging to a recurrent 
set is stochastically stable so are all other states in the recurrent set. This result 
permits us to simplify the computation of stochastic potential needs to find the 
set of stochastically stable states: we can consider only the states belonging to a 
recurrent set; then if exists only one recurrent set, all states belonging to it are 
stochastically stable otherwise, if more than one recurrent set exists, we have to  
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compute the stochastic potential considering only the transition from any state 
in a recurrent set to any other state in the other recurrent set that requires the 
minimum number of mutation. Let  a S  and  b S  be 2 recurrent sets. The 
stochastic potential of a state  a sS ˛  is given by  11 abab SmS -++-  where 
ba m  denotes the minimum number of mutations needs to induce a transitions 
from  b S  to  a S  and  x S  denotes the number of elements in  x S . The stochastic 
potential of  a state  b sS ˛  is given by  11 aabb SmS -++- . Therefore, to 
determine the stochastically stable states is enough to consider only the terms  
ab m  and  ba m . 
Before to continue the proof of Theorem 1 we introduce some convenient 
notation. Given any agent in a network g, we denote by  h q  the number of active 
links she supports to players choosing action h, where  { } h,  ab ˛ . Similarly,  h r  
stands for the number of passive links received from players choosing action h 
where  { } h, ab ˛ .   
Consider part a of Theorem 1, that is 
2 kee £- . In this range of link cost, 
using the result stated in proposition 3, we identify 2 candidates to be recurrent 
sets:  Sb  characterized by  ( )
c g b  and   Sa  characterized by  ( )
m g a .  
1.  Now we compute the minimum number of mutations needs to move the 
system from  Sa  to Sb  and denote it by  mab . The payoff from choosing 
action  b  for a player i is given by: 
      (2.15)      ( ) ( ) ( ) i n1eLqk b b P=-￿-+￿  
where: L denotes the number of  a -groups do not linked to agent i. On 
the other hand, the payoff from choosing  a  is equal to:  
(2.16)      ( ) ( ) i n1mLk ab a P=---￿ 
The agent i prefers action  b  only if the following is true: 
(2.17)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 110 ii mqkne abb ba P-P=-￿--￿-‡  
The more favorable condition to induce the transition is when all  b -
agents are supporting a link with agent i, that is  0 qb = . Solving (2.17) 
in  mab  as an equality we find the minimum number of  b -agents 
(mutants) needs to induce the transition to  Sb  that is given by: 
(2.18)      ( ) ( ) 11 mne ab =-￿-  
15
2.  Now we compute the minimum number of mutations to lead the system 
from  Sb  to  Sa  and denote it by  mba. The payoff from choosing action 
b  for a player i is given by (2.15). The payoff from choosing  a  is 
equal to:  
(2.19)      ( ) i mLk ba a P=-￿ 
The agent i prefers action a  only if the following is true: 
(2.20)    ( ) ( ) ( ) 10 ii mneqk bab ab P-P=--￿+￿‡ 
The more favorable condition to induce the transition is for 
qn1m bba =-- , that is when agent i supports links with all  b -agents.  
Solving (2.20) in  mba we obtain the minimum number of mutations 
needs to induce the transition to  Sa that is given by: 









The states in  Sa  are stochastically stable if and only if  mm abba > . Using 
expressions (2.18) and (2.21), we write this condition as:  





Otherwise the stochastically stable states are those in  Sb . The necessary 
condition for only one of these sets to be stochastically stable is a sufficiently 
large number of agent such that the minimum number of mutation to lead the 
system from a recurrent set to another is greater than one and  mm1 abba -> . 
Consider part b of Theorem 1, that is 
2 eeke -££. In this case, using the 
result stated in proposition 3 and that in Theorem 1 in Feri (2003)
8, if  n is 
sufficiently large, we identify two candidates to be recurrent sets:  Sa  defined in 
point a, and  Sb  characterized by  ( )
s g b .  
1.  Now we compute the minimum number of mutation to lead the system 
from  Sa  to  Sb  and denote it by  mab . The payoff from choosing action 
b  for a player i is given by:  
(2.23)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i rrqqxeyzdqqk ababab b P=++++￿++￿-+￿  
                                                 
8 by this we are able to concentrate ourattention only on star networks.  
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where x denotes the number of a -agents indirectly linked with agent i 
through others a -agents, y is the number of a -agents indirectly linked 
with agent i through  b -agents, z is the number of  b -agents indirectly 
linked with agent i through  b -agents and 
2 ekde -££.  On the other 
hand, the payoff from choosing  a  is equal to:  
(2.24)    ( ) ( ) iy n1mqLk aba a P=---+￿  
where  y L  denotes the number of a -groups do not linked to agent i (or 
linked through  b -agents). The agent  i prefers action  b  only if the 
following is true: 
(2.25)
( ) ( )





The more favorable condition to  induce this transition is for  0 qb = , 
0 z = , 
2 de = ,  y Ly = and  0 rqx aa ++=. Then (2.25) becomes: 
(2.26)    ( ) ( )
2 10 reyeknm bab ￿+￿+---‡  
Note that rm bab =  and  yn1m ab =-- .  Then, solving (2.26) in mab  we 
find the minimum number of  b -agents (mutants) needs to induce the 
transition to  Sb  that is given by: 











We note that for 
2 k1e ‡-  it is not possible to find a sufficiently large 
value of n such that  1 mab > . 
3.  Now we compute the minimum number of mutations to lead the system 
from  Sb  to  Sa  and denote it by  mba. The payoff from choosing action 
b  for a player i is given by (2.23). The payoff from choosing  a  is 
equal to:  
(2.28)    ( ) ( ) iy mqLk baa a P=-+￿  
The agent i prefers action a  only if the following is true: 
(2.29) 
  ( ) ( )







We note that in (2.23) agent i is optimally indirectly tied with the y a -
agents if  y yeLkyd ￿-￿£￿. Therefore  y yeLkyd ￿£￿+￿. Then the 
more favorable condition for the transition is given by  y0 = , r0 b =  and 
z0 = . In this case, noting that  rqxm aaba ++=  and     1 qnm bba =-- ,  
we find that the minimum number of  a -agents (mutants) needs to 
induce the transition to  Sa  is given by: 









The states in  Sa  are stochastically stable if and only if  mm abba > . Using 
expressions (2.27) and (2.30), we write this condition as:  








Otherwise the stochastically stable states are those in  Sb . The necessary 
condition for only one of these sets to be stochastically stable is a sufficiently 
large number of agent such that the minimum number of mutations to lead the 
system in an equilibrium out of the recurrent set is greater than one and 
mm1 abba -> . 
Consider part c of Theorem 1 that is for  ek1 ££. In this case, using the 
result stated in proposition 3 and that in Theorem 1 in Feri (2003)
9, for a 
sufficiently large value of n, we have 2 possible recurrent sets:  Sa  defined in 
point a and  Sb  characterized by  ( )
ps g b .  
1.  To lead the system out of  Sb  is sufficient only one mutation of a 
peripheral agent i that chooses to form links with all others. If all other 
agents have the chance to revise before i, the system converges towards 
a  ( )
cs g b  . This structure is unsustainable and the dynamic process leads 
the system to a   
e g .  From this state there is a positive probability that 
system goes in  Sa .   
2.  Now we compute the range of link cost such that is sufficient only one 
mutation to lead the system from  Sa  to  Sb . First we consider the 
                                                 
9 by this we are able to concentrate our attention only on star networks with links supported 
by peripheral agents.  
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conditions to lead the system from  Sa  to Sb . The payoff from choosing 
action  b  for a player i is given by:  
(2.32)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i rrqqxeyzdqqk ababab b P=++++￿++￿-+￿  
On the other hand, the payoff from choosing  a  is equal to:  
(2.33)    ( ) ( ) ( ) i n1mqLk aba a P=---+￿  
where  L denotes the number of  a -groups do not tied with  i or 
indirectly linked through  b -agents. The agent i prefers action  b  only if 
the following is true: 
(2.34)
( ) ( )





The more favorable condition for the transition is when  q0 b = ,  z0 = ,  
2 de = ,  Ly = ,  0 rqx aa ++=. Inserting these conditions in (2.34) and 
arranging for  Ln1m ab =--  and rm bab = , we obtain: 
(2.35)     ( ) ( )
2 110 nmekme abab --￿+-+￿‡ 
Solving  (2.35) in  k assuming  m1 ab = we find the range of link cost 
where to induce the transition to  Sb  is sufficient only one mutation, that 
is given by: 







That for large values of n can be approximated by 
2 k1e ‡- .   
Follows that if the condition  (2.36) is not satisfied only states in  Sa  are 
stochastically stable, while when this condition is satisfied are stochastically 
stable either states in  Sa  and   Sb . 
Consider part d of Theorem 1 that is for k1 ‡ . In this case, using the result 
stated in proposition 3 and that in Theorem 1 in Feri (2003)
10, for a sufficiently 
large value of n, we have 2 possible recurrent sets:  e S  characterized by 
e g  and 
Sb  characterized by  ( )
ps g b . To lead the system from a state in  Sb  to an empty 
network is sufficient only one mutation (see part c). On the contrary  to conduce 
                                                 
10 by this we are able to concentrate our attention only on star networks.  
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the system from an empty network to a state in  Sb  needs only one mutation if 
and only if the cost  k is relatively lower. Consider an empty network. A 






‡  all no connected agents will choose to form a link with agent i as 
soon as possible. If there are at least other  1 n  agents without links revising their 
strategy before than the central agent will do,  the system will have a star 
network with at least  1 n  links supported by peripheral agents.  From this state 
the no perturbed dynamic leads the system to a star network with links 
supported by peripheral agents. The condition on the link cost k that permits 
this transition with  only one mutation is:  





£+ .   
Therefore if (2.37) is satisfied, both  ( )
ps g b  and 
e g  are stochastically stable 
states, otherwise only 
e g  are stochastically stable states. 
We consider the stochastically stable states as the states where the system 
spends most of the time. With this consideration in hand we explain the main 
characteristics of the model using the following figure where we display the 
stochastically stable states in according to the levels of e and k (x-axis displays 
























ps g b ( )
m g a 
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We note as efficient states are stochastically stable mainly for small values of e. 
Intuition is that if the premium to play efficient action is small the rational 
individuals spend most of the time on the risk dominant action or that is more 
probable that the system converges in a state characterized by individuals 
coordinated on risk dominant action.  The second feature of the model is that, 
given a sufficiently low value of e,  efficient states are stochastically stable only 
for intermediate values of k.  Indeed for small values of k, the advantage to be 
coordinated on the efficient states, deriving from a smaller number of links,  is 
lower. On the other side for large values of k coordination problems seem to 
play an important role to rule out the efficient states.  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed in a stylized form a social network 
characterized by an endogenous network architecture.  We have considered the 
variety of networks with decay and we have modeled this as endogenous. The 
main result regard the analysis of equilibria. In our frameworks decay is 
assumed to depend on the actions chosen by agents participating to the network. 
We assume that agents can choose among two actions: one is efficient while the 
other is risk dominant. The empirical counterpart is the trade off between 
efficient technologies and compatible technologies.  
In this model we have a greater number of equilibria and we are not able to 
produce a full description of them; on the contrary we are able to produce a full 
characterization of the subset of stochastically stable states. Differently from 
the results in Jackson and Watts [12] and Goyal and Vega Redondo [9], in our 
model the network structure depends on which action individuals coordinate. 
Moreover efficient states are stochastically stable for intermediate levels of link 
cost and not for high levels. The first difference in the results is due to the fact 
that the social game determines the decay level and not only the payoff. 
Therefore this result follows those in Jackson and Wolinsky [13] and Bala and 
Goyal [1]. The fact to have different network structures in according to the 
action on which individuals coordinate, affects the dynamic selection given that 
every network structure produces different esternalities on the participants. This 
explains the difference in the results regarding the stochastically stable states 
too.   
Further development can be made in many directions. First, we might 
consider a model with two-side link formation: this is more similar to real 
world and it may change the result on stochastic stability. Second, we might use 
a setting where small deviations from the best response are more probable that  
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the large ones. Third, we can model the endogenous decay with different social 
game that can be more respondent to different empirical situations. Finally, we 
could study  applications regarding the diffusion of technologies and the 
hierarchical and social structure in the enterprises and firms. 
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Appendix. 
Proof of lemma 1.  
Given any  g, let be  ( ) { } ;:1 at least for one ,
ij MigiNjNji g =˛=˛„  and 
( ) { } ;:0  
ij LigiNjN g =˛="˛ . Give the chance to revise only to agents 
iM ˛ . After each  revision  M  decreases or does not change while   L  
increases or does not change. Therefore the system goes in a state where M is 
empty (
e g ) or in a state where  M  and   L  do not change.  In this last case 
iM "˛  obtains a positive net payoff from her (link) strategy and if  2 M ‡  all 
agents  iM ˛  are in the same component. Suppose more than 1 component; 
each agent in one given component can add to its current links the links 
supported by any player in another component and, by doing so, obtains an 
additional payoff. We note as 
e g  never is an equilibrium for k1 < . In this state 
agents with the chance to revise choose the action randomly and when happen 
that one chooses action  a , all revising agents will have as best response to 
choose action  a  and to be tied in an unique a -group (connected network). On 
the contrary, when  k1 >  
e g  is an equilibrium. QED.   
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Proof of lemma 2.  
Suppose that in a generic state there are 2 agents indirectly linked through  1 l+  
links. Then, one of two agents can improve her payoff forming a direct link 
with the other agent given that 
l1 eek
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